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Abstract
The problem of private information retrieval with graph-based replicated storage was recently
introduced by Raviv, Tamo and Yaakobi. Its capacity remains open in almost all cases. In this
work the asymptotic (large number of messages) capacity of this problem is studied along with
its generalizations to include arbitrary T -privacy and X-security constraints, where the privacy
of the user must be protected against any set of up to T colluding servers and the security of the
stored data must be protected against any set of up to X colluding servers. A general achievable
scheme for arbitrary storage patterns is presented that achieves the rate (ρmin−X−T )/N , where
N is the total number of servers, and each message is replicated at least ρmin times. Notably, the
scheme makes use of a special structure inspired by dual Generalized Reed Solomon (GRS) codes.
A general converse is also presented. The two bounds are shown to match for many settings,
including symmetric storage patterns. Finally, the asymptotic capacity is fully characterized for
the case without security constraints (X = 0) for arbitrary storage patterns provided that each
message is replicated no more than T +2 times. As an example of this result, consider PIR with
arbitrary graph based storage (T = 1, X = 0) where every message is replicated at exactly 3
servers. For this 3-replicated storage setting, the asymptotic capacity is equal to 2/ν2(G) where
ν2(G) is the maximum size of a 2-matching in a storage graph G[V,E]. In this undirected graph,
the vertices V correspond to the set of servers, and there is an edge uv ∈ E between vertices
u, v only if a subset of messages is replicated at both servers u and v.
1
1 Introduction
As distributed storage systems become increasingly prevalent, there are mounting concerns regard-
ing user privacy and data security. The problem of X-secure and T -private information retrieval
(XSTPIR) deals with both of these issues [1]. In its basic form, private information retrieval (PIR)
involves K datasets (messages) that are replicated at N distributed servers, and a user who wishes
to retrieve one of these datasets without revealing any information about the identity of his desired
dataset to any of the servers [2, 3]. XSTPIR is a generalization of PIR where the stored data must
remain secure as long as the number of colluding servers is not more than X, and the user’s privacy
must be preserved as long as the number of colluding servers is not more than T [1]. The rate of a
PIR scheme is the ratio of the number of bits of desired message that are retrieved per bit of total
download from all servers. The supremum of achievable rates is called the capacity of PIR [4].
The capacity of the basic PIR setting was characterized in [4] for arbitrary number of messages
replicated across arbitrary number of servers. Following in the footsteps of [4] there has been a wave
of new results exploring the fundamental limits of PIR under a variety of constraints. This includes
PIR with T -privacy and replicated storage [5], PIR with MDS coded storage [6, 7], PIR with
optimal storage and upload cost [8], PIR with arbitrary message lengths [9], PIR with restricted
collusion patterns [10, 11], PIR with T -privacy and MDS coded storage [12, 13], multi-message
PIR [14], PIR with asymmetric traffic constraints [15], multi-round PIR [16], cache-aided and
otherwise storage-constrained PIR [17, 18], PIR with side-information [19, 20], PIR for computation
[21, 22, 23, 24], PIR for security against eavesdroppers [25, 26], PIR with Byzantine adversaries
[27, 28, 29], symmetrically secure PIR [30, 31, 32], and PIR with secure storage [33, 1].
Most relevant to this work is the recent characterization in [1] of the asymptotic (K → ∞)
capacity of XSTPIR as CXSTPIR = 1 − (X + T )/N . Note that the XSTPIR setting includes as
special case the TPIR setting, obtained by setting X = 0, as well as the original PIR setting,
obtained by setting X = 0 and T = 1. It is limited, however, by its assumption of fully replicated
storage, i.e., all messages are stored by all servers, which can be burdensome for large data sets.
Motivated by the preference for simple storage, Raviv, Tamo and Yaakobi in [34] introduced a
graph based replicated storage model. Instead of full replication where every message is replicated
at every server, graph based replication assumes that each message is replicated only among a
subset of servers. This allows a graph representation where the vertices are the N servers and
each message is represented by a hyperedge comprised of vertices (servers) where this message
is replicated. Reference [34] primarily focuses on GTPIR, i.e., PIR with graph based replicated
storage and T -privacy. An achievable scheme is proposed that achieves the rate 1/N as long as T
is smaller than the replication factor of each message (the number of servers where the message is
replicated), and is shown to be within a factor of 2 from optimality for some special cases. However,
optimal GTPIR schemes remain unknown in almost all settings. Understanding the key ideas that
constitute optimal PIR schemes under graph based replicated storage is our goal in this paper.
The main contributions of this work are as follows. We study the asymptotic capacity of T -
private and X-secure PIR with graph-based replicated storage, in short GXSTPIR. Recall that
asymptotic capacity is quite meaningful for PIR because the number of messages is typically large,
and the convergence of capacity to its asymptotic value tends to take place quite rapidly [1].
GXSTPIR includes as special cases the settings of GTPIR [34], XSTPIR [1], TPIR [5] and basic
PIR [4], and as such it presents a unified view of these settings. Our first result is an achievable
scheme for GXSTPIR that achieves the rate (ρmin−X−T )/N for arbitrary storage patterns provided
every message is replicated at least ρmin times. In addition to ideas like cross-subspace alignment,
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Reed-Solomon (RS) coded storage and RS coded queries that were previously used for XSTPIR
[1], a key novelty of our achievable scheme for GXSTPIR is how it creates and takes advantage of
a structure inspired by dual Generalized Reed Solomon (GRS) codes. This is explained intuitively
in Section 3.2. Our second contribution is a general converse bound for asymptotic capacity of
GXSTPIR with arbitrary storage patterns. While the asymptotic capacity of GXSTPIR remains
open in general, it is remarkable that our converse bound is tight in all settings where we are able
to settle the capacity. In particular, the general achievable scheme matches the converse bound
when the storage is symmetric, settling the asymptotic capacity for those settings. For several
examples with asymmetric storage, it turns out that the achievable scheme can be improved to
match the converse bound by applying it only after eliminating certain redundant servers. Thus,
the asymptotic capacity for such cases is settled as well. In general however, with arbitrary graph
based storage, more sophisticated achievable schemes may be obtained by combining our achievable
scheme with ideas from private computation [21]. To illustrate this, we consider the GTPIR problem
(X = 0) where every message is replicated no more than T + 2 times. As our final result, for this
problem we fully settle the asymptotic capacity for arbitrary storage patterns. The asymptotic
capacity depends strongly on the storage graph structure, and requires a private computation
scheme on top of our general achievable scheme. As an example of this result, consider GPIR,
i.e., PIR with arbitrary graph based storage (T = 1,X = 0) where every message is replicated at
exactly 3 servers. For this 3-replicated storage setting, the asymptotic capacity is exactly equal
to 2/ν2(G) where ν2(G) is the maximum size of a 2-matching in a storage graph G[V,E]. In this
storage graph, the vertices V correspond to the set of servers, and there is an edge uv ∈ E between
vertices u, v only if a subset of messages is replicated at both servers u and v. . This is consistent
with the intuition that storage graph properties must be essential to the asymptotic capacity of
graph-based storage.
Notation: For a positive integerM the notation [M ] denotes the set {1, 2, · · · ,M}. The notation
X[M ] stands for the set {X1,X2, . . . ,XM}. Similarly, for an index set I = {i1, i2, . . . , in}, XI
denotes the set {Xi1 ,Xi2 , . . . ,Xin}. If A is a set of random variables, then by H(A) we denote the
joint entropy of those random variables. Mutual informations between sets of random variables
are similarly defined. For tuples such as A = (a1, a2, · · · , an) we allow set theoretic notions of
inclusion. For example, b ∈ A denotes the relationship b ∈ {a1, a2, · · · , an}. Similarly, b ∈ A \ {a1}
denotes b ∈ {a2, a3, · · · , an}. The notation X ∼ Y is used to indicate that X and Y are identically
distributed. When a natural number, say ℓ ∈ N, is used to represent an element of a finite field Fq,
it denotes the sum of ℓ ones in Fq, i.e., ℓ ,
∑ℓ
l=1 1, where the addition is over Fq.
2 Problem Statement
We begin with a description of messages and storage structure. Based on the storage structure we
will partition the set of messages into M subsets so that the messages in the same subset have the
same storage structure. Define W = (W1,W2, · · · ,WM ) where Wm,m ∈ [M ], is comprised of Km
messages,
Wm = (Wm,1,Wm,2, · · · ,Wm,Km). (1)
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Messages are independent, and each message is composed of L i.i.d. uniform symbols from Fq, i.e.,
H(Wm,k) = H(Wm,k(1),Wm,k(2), · · · ,Wm,k(L)) = L, ∀m ∈ [M ], k ∈ [Km] (2)
H(W1,1, · · · ,WM,KM ) =
M∑
m=1
KmL, (3)
in q-ary units. There are a total of N servers. Corresponding to W = (W1, · · · ,WM ), let us define
R = (R1, · · · ,RM ), (4)
Rm = (Rm(1), · · · ,Rm(ρm)) ,∀m ∈ [M ], (5)
Rm(r) ∈ [N ],∀r ∈ [ρm], (6)
where Rm,m ∈ [M ] contains the servers, Rm(r) ∈ [N ] that store the m
th set of messages Wm.
Without loss of generality we will assume that the servers are listed in increasing order in each
tuple Rm. The cardinality of Rm is |Rm| = ρm, which will be referred to as the replication factor
for the messages in Wm. The minimum replication factor is defined as
ρmin , min
m∈[M ]
ρm. (7)
It is important to note that the messages may not be directly replicated at the servers. Because
of security constraints, each message Wm,k ∈ Wm, is represented by a total of ρm shares (the
nomenclature comes from secret-sharing), denoted Wm,k =
(
W
(n)
m,k, n ∈ Rm
)
, such that the share
W
(n)
m,k is stored at Server n, for all n ∈ Rm. Messages are independently secured and must be
recoverable from their shares, as specified by the following constraints.
H
(
W 1,1, · · · ,WM,Km
)
=
∑
m∈[M ],k∈[KM ]
H
(
Wm,k
)
, (8)
H
(
Wm,k |Wm,k
)
= 0. (9)
The information stored at Server n is defined as
Sn =
{
W
(n)
m,k,m ∈ [M ], k ∈ [Km],Rm ∋ n
}
. (10)
Let us also define the index set of Wm that are stored at Server n, as
Mn = {m ∈ [M ]
∣∣∣Rm ∋ n}. (11)
For example, suppose we have M = 4 message sets (each comprised of Km = 2 messages), stored
at N = 4 servers as shown.
W1,W2,W3
Server 1
W1,W2
Server 2
W2,W4
Server 3
W1,W3,W4
Server 4
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Then for this example,1 we have,
M1 = {1, 2, 3}, S1 = {W
(1)
1,1 ,W
(1)
1,2 ,W
(1)
2,1 ,W
(1)
2,2 ,W
(1)
3,1 ,W
(1)
3,2 }, R1 = (1, 2, 4), ρ1 = 3, (12)
M2 = {1, 2}, S2 = {W
(2)
1,1 ,W
(2)
1,2 ,W
(2)
2,1 ,W
(2)
2,2 }, R2 = (1, 2, 3), ρ2 = 3, (13)
M3 = {2, 4}, S3 = {W
(3)
2,1 ,W
(3)
2,2 ,W
(3)
4,1 ,W
(3)
4,2 }, R3 = (1, 4), ρ3 = 2, (14)
M4 = {1, 3, 4}, S4 = {W
(4)
1,1 ,W
(4)
1,2 ,W
(4)
3,1 ,W
(4)
3,2 ,W
(4)
4,1 ,W
(4)
4,2 }, R4 = (3, 4), ρ4 = 2, (15)
and ρmin = 2.
The X-secure constraint, 0 ≤ X ≤ N , requires that any X (or fewer) colluding servers learn
nothing about the messages.
[X-Security] I(SX ;W) = 0, ∀X ⊂ [N ], |X | ≤ X. (16)
X = 0 represents the setting without security constraints. If X = 0, then no secret sharing is
needed, so each share of a message is the message itself,
X = 0 =⇒ W
(n)
m,k =Wm,k, ∀n ∈ Rm. (17)
This completes the description of the messages and the storage at the N servers. Next, let us
describe the private information retrieval aspect.
The user desires the messageWµ,κ, where the indices µ and κ are chosen privately and uniformly
by the user from µ ∈ [M ], κ ∈ [Kµ], respectively. In order to retrieve his desired message, the user
generates N queries, Q
[µ,κ]
1 , Q
[µ,κ]
2 , . . . , Q
[µ,κ]
N , and sends the n
th query, Q
[µ,κ]
n to the n-th server. The
user has no prior knowledge of the message realizations,
I
(
S[N ] ; µ, κ,Q
[1,1]
[N ] , · · · , Q
[M,KM ]
[N ]
)
= 0. (18)
A T -private scheme, 1 ≤ T ≤ N , requires that any T (or fewer) colluding servers learn nothing
about (µ, κ).
[T -Privacy] I
(
Q
[µ,κ]
T ; µ, κ
)
= 0, ∀T ⊂ [N ], |T | ≤ T. (19)
Upon receiving the queryQ
[µ,κ]
n , the n-th server generates an answer string A
[µ,κ]
n , which is a function
of the query Q
[µ,κ]
n and its stored information Sn.
H
(
A[m,k]n | Q
[m,k]
n , Sn
)
= 0, ∀m ∈ [M ], k ∈ [Km]. (20)
The correctness constraint guarantees that from all the answers, the user is able to decode the
desired message Wµ,κ,
[Correctness] H
(
Wµ,κ | A
[µ,κ]
[N ] , Q
[µ,κ]
[N ] , µ, κ
)
= 0. (21)
The rate of a GXSTPIR scheme is defined by the number of q-ary symbols of desired message that
are retrieved per downloaded q-ary symbol,
R =
H(Wµ,κ)∑
n∈[N ]H
(
A
[µ,κ]
n
) = L
D
, (22)
1Incidentally, our results will show that as Km → ∞, for this example C∞ = 1/3, and Server 2 is redundant.
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where D =
∑
n∈[N ]H
(
A
[µ,κ]
n
)
is the expected total number of q-ary symbols downloaded by the
user from all servers. The capacity of GXSTPIR, denoted as C(N,X, T,W,S), is the supremum
of R across all feasible schemes. In this work we are interested in the setting where each subset
of messages is comprised of a large number of messages. Specifically, we wish to characterize the
asymptotic capacity, as Km →∞ for all m ∈ [M ]. In order to have Km approach infinity together
for all m ∈ [M ], let us define,
Kmin = ⌈χmK⌉, (23)
so that χm,m ∈ [M ] are fixed constants, whileK approaches infinity. Then the asymptotic capacity
is defined as
C∞ = lim
K→∞
C(N,X, T,W,S). (24)
Note that the number of message sets,M , and the storage pattern R remain unchanged, while Km,
i.e., the number of messages in each Wm approaches infinity.
3 Results
Our first result is a general achievability argument that provides us a lower bound on the asymptotic
capacity of GXSTPIR.
Theorem 1. The asymptotic capacity of GXSTPIR is bounded below as follows,
C∞ ≥
ρmin −X − T
N
. (25)
The proof of Theorem 1 appears in Section 4. An interesting aspect of the proof is the use
of a structure inspired by dual GRS codes, that is intuitively explained in Section 3.2. Another
interesting aspect of Theorem 1 is that applying it to a subset of servers (by eliminating the rest)
may produce a higher achievable rate than if all servers were used. Therefore, in order to find the
best achievable rate guaranteed by Theorem 1 we must choose the best subset of servers. Example
4 in Section 3.1 illustrates this idea.
Our next result is a converse argument that holds for arbitrary storage patterns. Recall that
Dn = H(A
[µ,κ]
n )/L is the normalized download from Server n.
Theorem 2. The asymptotic capacity of GXSTPIR is bounded above as follows,
C∞ ≤
{
0, ρmin ≤ X + T
max(D1,··· ,DN )∈D (D1 +D2 + · · · +DN )
−1 , ρmin > X + T
(26)
and D is defined as
D ,

(D1, · · · ,DN ) ∈ RN+
∣∣∣ ∑
n∈R′m
Dn ≥ 1, ∀m ∈ [M ],R
′
m ⊂ Rm, |R
′
m| = |Rm| −X − T

 .
(27)
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The proof of Theorem 2 appears in Section 5. Since the asymptotic capacity is zero for ρmin ≤
X + T , in the remainder of this section we will assume that ρmin > X + T .
Remark: Note that (27) implies that the total normalized download from any ρm − X − T
servers in Rm must be at least 1. A simple averaging argument implies that the total normalized
download from all ρm servers in any Rm must be at least ρm/(ρm −X − T ).
The general lower bound in Theorem 1 is in closed form and the general upper bound in
Theorem 2 is essentially a linear program, so for arbitrary settings it is possible to evaluate both
to check if they match (provided the parameter values are not too large to be computationally
feasible). Conceptually, the condition for them to match may be understood as follows. Consider
a hypergraph G(V, E) with the set of vertices V = [N ] representing the N servers, and the set of
hyperedges E such that e ∈ E if and only if ∃m ∈ [M ] such that e ⊂ Rm and |Rm| − |e| = X + T .
For this graph, hyperedges e ∈ E , with corresponding weights xe ∈ R+, are said to form a fractional
matching if for every vertex v ∈ V the total weight of the edges that include v is less than or equal
to 1. The largest possible total weight of a fractional matching is called the fractional matching
number of G [35]. As shown in Lemma 1 in Appendix A, the optimal converse bound from Theorem
2 on the total normalized download, i.e., minD(D1 + · · ·+DN ) is equal to the fractional matching
number of G[V, E ]. Thus, the following corollary immediately follows.
Corollary 1. The lower bound of Theorem 1 matches the upper bound of Theorem 2 if and only if
the fractional matching number of G(V, E) is equal to N
ρmin−X−T
. For all such cases, the asymptotic
capacity C∞ = (ρmin −X − T )/N .
Next let us identify some interesting special cases of Corollary 1.
Let RM′ be a collection of the sets Rm,m ∈ M
′ ⊂ [M ]. We define RM′ to be an exact
b-cover of [N ] if ρm = ρmin for all m ∈ M
′, and every element of [N ] is contained in exactly b
sets in RM′ . It follows that the asymptotic capacity C∞ = (ρmin − X − T )/N if there exists an
exact b-cover for some b ∈ Z+. This is easily seen because for each Rm in RM′ we have the bound∑
n∈Rm
Dn ≥ ρmin/(ρmin−X−T ) according to (27). Adding all these bounds we obtain the desired
converse bound b
∑
n∈[N ]Dn ≥ (bN/ρmin)(ρmin/(ρmin−X−T )), i.e.,
∑
n∈[N ]Dn ≥ N/(ρmin−X−T ),
which is achievable according to Theorem 1.
As a special case that is of particular interest, define a symmetric storage setting as one where
(after some permutation of message and server indices) for all m ∈ [M ], Rm = (ρm + 1, ρm +
2, · · · , ρm+ ρmin). Here, ρ ≤ ρmin and server indices are interpreted modulo N , e.g., Server N + 1
is the same as Server 1. Furthermore, b = Mρmin/N is an integer value. Then any symmetric
storage setting thus defined has asymptotic capacity C∞ = (ρmin −X − T )/N because the storage
sets form an exact b-cover.
Based on these observations, here are some examples of storage patterns where the asymptotic
capacity is C∞ = (ρmin −X − T )/N .
1. R = ((1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 1)) which is a symmetric storage setting (forms an exact 2 cover).
2. R = ((1, 2, 3), (3, 4, 5), (5, 1, 2), (2, 3, 4), (4, 5, 1)) which is a symmetric storage setting (forms
an exact 3-cover).
3. R = ((1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 1), (4, 5), (5, 6), (6, 4)) because it forms an exact 2 cover.
4. R = ((1, 2, 3), (4, 5, 6), (i, j, k), (a, b, c, d)) for arbitrary {i, j, k}, {a, b, c, d} ⊂ [N ] = [6] because
it contains an exact 1-cover, RM′ = {(1, 2, 3), (4, 5, 6)}.
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5. R = ((1, 2, 3), (3, 4, 1), (2, 5, 6), (4, 5, 6), (1, 3, 6), (1, 2, 5, 6)) because it contains an exact 2-
cover of [N ] = [6] in RM′ = {(1, 2, 3), (3, 4, 1), (2, 5, 6), (4, 5, 6)}.
While the existence of an exact b-cover for some positive integer b is sufficient to guarantee that
the asymptotic capacity is C∞ = (ρmin −X − T )/N , it is not a necessary condition. Examples 1
and 2 in Section 3.1 show such settings.
On the other hand, it is also easy to see that the lower bound of Theorem 1 and the upper
bound of Theorem 2 do not always match. Remarkably, in all such cases that we have been able to
settle so far, it is the upper bound that is tight, and the achievability that needs to be improved.
In many cases, such as Example 4 in Section 3.1, an improved achievability result is found easily by
eliminating a redundant server before applying Theorem 1. However, more sophisticated achievable
schemes may be required in general.
Our final result emphasizes this point by settling the asymptotic capacity of GTPIR, i.e., T -
private information retrieval with arbitrary graph based storage and no security constraints (X =
0), provided each message is replicated no more than (T + 2) times. Because this result deals
with arbitrary storage patterns, for its precise statement we will need the following definitions that
follow the convention of Schrijver [35].
Definition 1. Define G = (V,E) as a simple undirected graph with vertices V = [N ] corresponding
to the N servers, and with edges uv ∈ E if and only if {u, v} ⊂ Rm for some m ∈ [M ].
Definition 2. A set U ⊂ V is called a stable set (also called independent set) if there are no edges
between any two members of U .
Definition 3. For U ⊂ [N ], define N (U) as the set of vertices in V \U that are neighbors of vertices
in U .
Definition 4. Define δ(n) as the set of edges incident with vertex n.
Definition 5. A function x : E → Z+ is denoted as a vector x ∈ Z
E
+. A function y : V → Z+ is
similarly denoted as a vector y ∈ ZV+. The size of a vector is defined as the sum of its entries.
Definition 6. For any x ∈ ZE+, and F ⊂ E, define x(F ) =
∑
f∈F x(f).
Definition 7. A b-matching in G is defined as a vector x ∈ ZE+ satisfying x(δ(v)) ≤ b for each
vertex v ∈ V . The maximum size of a b-matching in G is defined as νb(G).
Definition 8. Define Nr as the set of servers that do not store any messages that are replicated
fewer than r times.
Nr , {n ∈ [N ]
∣∣∣m ∈Mn =⇒ ρm > r}. (28)
It is worthwhile to recall that from basic results in graph theory (see Chapter 30, Section 30.1 of
Schrijver [35]), it is known that
ν2(G) = min{|V \U |+ |N (U)|
∣∣∣ U ⊂ V, and U is a stable set}. (29)
With this we are ready to state our final result.
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Theorem 3. The asymptotic capacity of GTPIR with ρm ≤ T +2 for all m ∈ [M ], i.e., when each
message set is replicated no more than (T + 2) times, is
C∞ =
{
0, ρmin ≤ T
2
ν2(G[NT+2])+2|NT+1|
, ρmin > T
. (30)
The proof of Theorem 3 appears in Section 6. While the converse bound for Theorem 3 follows
directly from the general converse bound in Theorem 2, the achievability goes beyond the scheme of
Theorem 1, to involve a limited generalization to private computation that is presented in Section
4.1. As an interesting special case of Theorem 3, note that if all messages are T +2 replicated, i.e.,
NT+1 is an empty set, then the asymptotic capacity is exactly 2/ν2(G).
3.1 Examples
Let us consider a few more examples to illustrate our results. For these examples we set X = 0, T =
1 for simplicity, but similar examples are easily constructed for X > 0, T > 1 as well.
1. Consider M = 4 message sets, stored at N = 4 servers according to the replication pattern
R1 = (1, 2, 4), R2 = (1, 2, 3), R3 = (1, 3, 4). Since every message is 3-replicated, according to
Theorem 1 we have C∞ ≥ 2/4 = 1/2. For the converse we note that R1 =⇒ D1 +D2 ≥ 1,
R2 =⇒ D2+D3 ≥ 1, R3 =⇒ D3+D4 ≥ 1,D4+D1 ≥ 1, and adding these bounds gives us
D1 +D2 +D3 +D4 ≥ 2. Thus we have C∞ = 1/2 for this example. Note that this example
does not contain an exact b-cover for any positive integer b, but the asymptotic capacity for
this example is still C∞ = (ρmin −X − T )/N .
2. Consider M = 3 message sets stored at N = 5 servers according to the replication pattern
R1 = (1, 3, 4),R2 = (3, 4, 5),R3 = (2, 3, 5), so that every message is 3-replicated, but the
storage is not symmetric, nor does it contain an exact b-cover. For the converse we note that
R1 =⇒ D4+D1 ≥ 1,D1+D3 ≥ 1; R3 =⇒ D3+D2 ≥ 1,D2+D5 ≥ 1; R2 =⇒ D5+D4 ≥ 1;
and combining these bounds gives us the converse bound as C∞ ≤ maxD 1/(
∑
n∈[5]Dn) ≥ 5/2.
Since ρmin = 3, Theorem 1 shows that the rate (ρmin−X−T )/N = 2/5 is achievable, so that
C∞ = 2/5 for this example.
3. Consider M = 3 message sets stored at N = 5 servers according to the replication pattern
R1 = (1, 3, 4),R2 = (1, 3, 4, 5),R3 = (2, 3, 5), so that messages in W2 are 4-replicated while
those in W1,W3 are only 3-replicated. For the converse we note that R1 =⇒ D1 + D3 ≥
1,D3 +D4 ≥ 1,D4 +D1 ≥ 1; while R3 =⇒ 2D2 + 2D5 ≥ 2. Adding them up we have the
bound D1 +D2 +D3 +D4 +D5 ≥ 5/2, which gives us the converse bound C∞ ≤ 2/5. Since
ρmin = 3, the lower bound from Theorem 1 is also 2/5, so that C∞ = 2/5 for this example.
Note that we could eliminate any one element from R2 so that messages in W2 are also only
3-replicated, but that would not change the asymptotic capacity. Or we could add one more
element to R2 so that messages in W2 are replicated at every server, and that would also not
change the capacity. Thus, this example illustrates redundant storage.
4. Consider M = 2 message sets stored at N = 5 servers according to the replication pattern
R1 = (1, 2, 3, 4), R2 = (2, 3, 4, 5), so that each message is 4-replicated. The converse from
Theorem 2 says C∞ ≤ 2/3, but since ρmin = 4, Theorem 1 applied directly only proves the
achievability of rate (ρmin − X − T )/N = 3/5 which does not match the converse bound.
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However, note that if we eliminate Server 1 and Server 5, then we are left with the same2
M = 2 message sets stored at N ′ = 3 servers according to the replication pattern R′1 =
(2, 3, 4),R′2 = (2, 3, 4), for which ρ
′
min = 3, and Theorem 1 shows that the rate (ρ
′
min −X −
T )/N ′ = 2/3 is achievable, which indeed matches the converse bound. Thus, the asymptotic
capacity for this example is C∞ = 2/3. The example shows that achievable rates may be
improved by eliminating redundant servers.
5. Consider M = 4 message sets stored at N = 5 servers according to the storage pattern
R1 = (1, 2, 3),R2 = (2, 3, 4),R3 = (1, 3, 5),R4 = (2, 4), so that messages in W1,W2,W3 are
3-replicated, while messages in R4 are 2-replicated, and ρmin = 2. The achievable scheme
from Theorem 1 achieves a rate 1/5, however Theorem 3 builds upon that scheme to achieve
the rate 2/7 which also matches the converse. Thus, for this setting, the capacity is settled
by Theorem 3 as C∞ = 2/7.
6. Consider M = 5 message sets stored at N = 8 servers according to the storage pattern
R1 = (1, 2, 3),R2 = (1, 3, 4),R3 = (4, 5, 7),R4 = (4, 6, 7),R5 = (7, 8). The capacity for this
case is settled by Theorem 3 as 2/9. To explicitly see the converse bound, note that in (27)
R1 =⇒ D1 + D2 + D3 ≥ 3/2; R5 =⇒ D7 ≥ 1,D8 ≥ 1; and R3 =⇒ D4 + D5 ≥ 1.
Adding these bounds we have D1 + D2 + D3 + D4 + D5 + D7 + D8 ≥ 9/2, which implies
that asymptotically the total normalized download D ≥ 9/2 and the converse bound follows.
The graph representation for this setting, G(V,E) is shown in Figure 1. Vertices in N3 =
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} are shown with a red border, while vertices in N2 = {7, 8} are shown with
a black border. The maximum size of a 2-matching on G[N3] is 5, corresponding to the 5
edges shown in red. Alternatively, it corresponds to the choice of U = {5, 6} ⊂ N3 in (29).
Note that while U has 2 neighbors in G, i.e., N (U) = {4, 7}, it has only 1 neighbor in N3,
i.e., N (U) ∩ N3 = {4}. Therefore, ν2(G[N3]) + 2|N2| = |N3 \ U | + |N (U) ∩ N3| + 2|N2| =
4 + 1 + 2(2) = 9. Achievability follows by the scheme presented in the proof of Theorem 3,
downloading a symbol from each of [N ]\U = {1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8}, and downloading another symbol
from each of N (U) ∪ N2 = {4, 7, 8} according to a private computation scheme described in
Section 4.1, for a total download of 9 symbols from which 2 desired symbols are retrieved.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 8
Figure 1: The graph G[V,E] for Example 6.
3.2 Solution Structure inspired by Dual GRS Codes
The most interesting aspect of the achievable scheme in Theorem 1 is a generalized query and
storage structure that is inspired by dual GRS codes. Since the storage and query structure for
XSTPIR in [1] was based on RS codes, the generalization to GRS code structure for GXSTPIR is
2Note that while some servers may be eliminated (i.e., not used) by an achievable scheme, the message sets cannot
be reduced because the achievable scheme must still work for all messages.
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somewhat serendipitous (note that the G in GRS codes is not automatically associated with the G
in GXSTPIR which stands for Graph based replicated storage). It is also surprisingly effective, as
explained intuitively in this section.
Before discussing how GRS codes are a part of the solution, let us illustrate the nature of the
problem with a simple example. Let us consider a very basic setting, where we have M = 4 subsets
of messages, N = 4 servers, and ∀m ∈ [M ], we have Rm = [N ] \ {m}, i.e., messages in Wm are
stored at all servers except Server m. Let Vm,m ∈ [M ] be four vectors in F, each of size N×1, such
that the vector Vm has a zero in its m
th coordinate (reflecting the fact that messages in Wm are
not stored at Server m) and all other coordinates are non-zero. Then, as we will explain shortly,
the rank of the matrix [V1, V2, V3, V4] reflects the number of dimensions occupied by interference,
i.e., downloaded symbols that are undesired. For example, suppose we are operating in F5 and we
choose,
V = [V1, V2, V3, V4] =


0 1 1 1
1 0 3 2
1 2 0 4
1 3 1 0

 (31)
which has rank 2. Then this choice corresponds to a scheme where interference occupies rank(V ) = 2
out of the N = 4 dimensions, leaving the remaining 2 dimensions available for retrieving desired
message symbols. To see this explicitly, suppose each message is comprised of L = 2 symbols,
Wm,k = (Wm,k(1),Wm,k(2)) in F5, and the user desires the message Wµ,κ ∈ Wµ. The download
from the nth server is the nth row of the following N × 1 vector.
V =

 ∑
k∈[K1],ℓ∈[L]
W1,k(ℓ)Z1,k,(ℓ)

V1 +

 ∑
k∈[K2],ℓ∈[L]
W2,k(ℓ)Z2,k,(ℓ)

V2
+

 ∑
k∈[K3],ℓ∈[L]
W3,k(ℓ)Z3,k,(ℓ)

V3 +

 ∑
k∈[K4],ℓ∈[L]
W4,k(ℓ)Z4,k,(ℓ)

V4 (32)
+Wµ,κ(1)F
[µ,κ]
(1) +Wµ,κ(2)F
[µ,κ]
(2) (33)
The vectors F
[µ,κ]
(1) , F
[µ,κ]
(2) are two 4× 1 vectors, called demand vectors that help retrieve the desired
message symbols. To preserve privacy, the demand vectors F
[µ,κ]
(1) , F
[µ,κ]
(2) must also have zeros in the
coordinates where Vµ has zeros. The Zk,m,(ℓ) random variables are i.i.d. uniform noise terms added
to hide the demand vectors contained in the query sent to each server, thus ensuring privacy of
user’s demand. The demand vectors, which carry the 2 desired message symbols must be linearly
independent of V1, V2, V3, V4 which carry only interference. To retrieve his desired message, the
user projects V into the 2 dimensional null space of V1, V2, V3, V4, where all interference disappears
and only the two desired signal dimensions remain, from which the 2 desired symbols are retrieved.
The rate achieved by this scheme is 2/4 = 1/2 which is also the asymptotic capacity for this setting
(converse follows from Theorem 2).
From this example, it is clear that the problem is related to min-rank of the V matrix subject
to constraints on which terms take zero or non-zero values. These constraints are affected not
only by the given storage structure, but also from the possibility of redundant servers3 as well as
3As illustrated by examples in Section 3.1 the solution may be further optimized on storage structure by ignoring
redundant storage.
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privacy and correctness constraints, e.g., because demand vectors must share the same structure
to ensure privacy. Evidently, PIR with graph based storage is connected to other problems such as
index coding, where also min-rank is important [36]. For arbitrary storage patterns such min-rank
problems can be difficult to solve in general. However, now let us consider what happens if every
message is replicated the same number of times, |Rm| = ρm = ρmin for all m ∈ [M ]. As will be
shown in the proof of Theorem 3, even if replication factors vary across messages, schemes for such
settings may use the constant-replication-factor schemes as their essential building blocks. Thus,
the constant-replication-factor setting is of fundamental significance. It is also the setting where
we exploit the structure of dual GRS codes.
For simplicity we will only consider a setting with X = 0 and T = 1. Consider such a setting
with an arbitrary number of message sets M , with N = 5 servers, constant-replication-factor
ρmin = 3, and an arbitrary storage pattern reflected in the structure of the following V matrix.
V =


m=1 m=2 m=3 ··· m=M
Server 1 v1,1 0 v3,1 · · · vM,1
Server 2 0 v2,2 v3,2 · · · 0
Server 3 v1,3 v2,3 0 · · · vM,3
Server 4 v1,4 0 v3,4 · · · 0
Server 5 0 v2,5 0 · · · vM,5

 (34)
Note that the mth column has exactly ρm = 3 non-zero entries corresponding to the 3 servers that
store the messages in Wm. The structure of each column is arbitrary, fixed by the given storage
pattern, but each column must have exactly 3 non-zero entries. For this setting, it turns out that
regardless of the value of M , it is possible to choose non-zero values for vm,n such that the rank of
this matrix is not more than 3, i.e., all interference can be limited to 3 dimensions. This is done as
follows. Let βn be distinct non-zero constants for all n ∈ [N ]. Furthermore, let us define,
vm,n =

 ∏
n′∈Rm\{n}
(βn − βn′)

−1 (35)
Based on dual GRS codes (see Lemma 2), it turns out that this choice of vm,n ensures that∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
j
n = 0 (36)
for all j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , ρmin − 2}. For this example, since ρmin = 3, it means that
∑
n∈Rm
vm,n = 0,
and
∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβn = 0. Writing this out explicitly, we have
[
1 1 1 1 1
β1 β2 β3 β4 β5
]


1
(β1−β3)(β1−β4)
0 1(β1−β2)(β1−β4) · · ·
1
(β1−β3)(β1−β5)
0 1(β2−β3)(β2−β5)
1
(β2−β1)(β2−β4)
· · · 0
1
(β3−β1)(β3−β4)
1
(β3−β2)(β3−β5)
0 · · · 1(β3−β1)(β3−β5)
1
(β4−β1)(β4−β3)
0 1(β4−β1)(β4−β2) · · · 0
0 1(β5−β2)(β5−β3) 0 · · ·
1
(β5−β1)(β5−β3)

 =
[
0
0
]
(37)
which is easily verified because for any n1, n2, n3 ∈ [N ],
vm,n1 + vm,n2 + vm,n3 =
(βn2 − βn3) + (βn3 − βn1) + (βn1 − βn2)
(βn1 − βn2)(βn1 − βn3)(βn2 − βn3)
= 0, (38)
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vm,n1βn1 + vm,n2βn2 + vm,n3βn3 =
(βn2 − βn3)βn1 + (βn3 − βn1)βn2 + (βn1 − βn2)βn3
(βn1 − βn2)(βn1 − βn3)(βn2 − βn3)
= 0. (39)
Thus, there are ρmin − 1 = 2 vectors along which V has null projection, corresponding to j = 0
and j = 1 in (36). These two interference free dimensions allow us to retrieve 2 desired symbols,
achieving a rate of 2/5 for this example.
As another example, consider a setting with an arbitrary number of messagesM and an arbitrary
number of servers N , where each message is replicated 4 times, i.e., ρm = ρmin = 4 for all m ∈ [M ].
Given an arbitrary 4-replicated storage structure, choosing vm,n according to (35) allows us to find
ρmin−1 = 3 dimensions along which interference is nulled, corresponding to j = 0, j = 1, and j = 2
in (36). This is illustrated below.

 1 1 · · · 1β1 β2 · · · βN
β21 β
2
2 · · · β
2
N




Column m
... 0
...
row n1 · · · vm,n1 · · ·
... 0
...
row n2 · · · vm,n2 · · ·
... 0
...
row n3 · · · vm,n3 · · ·
... 0
...
row n4 · · · vm,n4 · · ·
... 0
...


=

00
0

 . (40)
Columnm corresponds to an arbitrary message setWm that is replicated at the 4 servers n1, n2, n3, n4,
and it is easily verified that if vm,n are chosen according to (35) then
vm,n1 + vm,n2 + vm,n3 + vm,n4 = 0, (41)
βn1vm,n1 + βn2vm,n2 + βn3vm,n3 + βn4vm,n4 = 0, (42)
β2n1vm,n1 + β
2
n2
vm,n2 + β
2
n3
vm,n3 + β
2
n4
vm,n4 = 0. (43)
Thus, there are 3 interference-free dimensions which allow us to retrieve 3 desired symbols for a
rate of 3/N .
In general, if the V matrix has ρmin non-zero entries in each column, then by assigning vm,n
according to (35) there are ρmin − 1 dimensions that are interference free, corresponding to j ∈
{0, 1, · · · , ρmin − 2} in (36), along which ρmin − 1 desired symbols can be retrieved to achieve the
rate (ρmin − 1)/N , which matches (ρmin − X − T )/N for X = 0, T = 1. When T > 1 and/or
X > 0, then additional interference terms enter into the picture due to the additional noise terms
needed to protect the messages (X-security) and the queries (T -privacy). Following the construction
previously introduced for XSTPIR, these additional interference dimensions are restricted by using
cross-subspace alignment [1]. Fortunately, since the storage and query structure used for XSTPIR
in [1] is also based on Reed Solomon Codes, it turns out to be compatible with the additional
structure imposed by the choice of vm,n in (35) according to dual Generalized Reed Solomon Codes.
Combining both ideas, it turns out that the number of interference free dimensions that remain
available for desired message symbols is equal to ρmin −X − T , which allows us to achieve a rate
of (ρmin −X − T )/N . The details are left to the proof of Theorem 1.
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4 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we present the achievable scheme for GXSTPIR for arbitrary N,T,X,M,Km, ρm
values that allows private retrieval of any desired message at a rate R = ρmin−X−T
N
. Without loss
of generality we will assume that ρm = ρmin for all m ∈ [M ]. For any message that is replicated
more than ρmin times, the scheme can be applied by arbitrarily choosing any ρmin replications of
that message and ignoring the rest. In order to achieve the rate R = ρmin−X−T
N
, the scheme will
retrieve ρmin −X − T desired symbols by downloading one symbol from each server.
The scheme operates over a block where each message is comprised of L symbols and we have
L = ρmin −X − T. (44)
All symbols are in Fq and without loss of generality we will assume that q > N + L. Let β[N ] be
distinct non-zero values in Fq such that
βn + ℓ 6= 0, ∀n ∈ [N ], ℓ ∈ [L]. (45)
Such βn must exist because q > L+N . Server n stores,
Sn = {W
(n)
m,(1),W
(n)
m,(2), · · · ,W
(n)
m,(L),∀m ∈ Mn} (46)
W
(n)
m,(ℓ) =Wm,(ℓ) +
∑
x∈[X]
(ℓ+ βn)
xZm,x,(ℓ) (47)
Wm,(ℓ) = [Wm,1(ℓ),Wm,2(ℓ), · · · ,Wm,Km(ℓ)], ∀ℓ ∈ [L]. (48)
Thus, for all m ∈ [M ], the 1×Km row vector Wm,(ℓ) contains the ℓ
th symbol from every message
in Wm. For all m ∈ [M ], x ∈ [X], ℓ ∈ [L], the 1 × Km row vectors Zm,x,(ℓ) are comprised of i.i.d.
uniform noise symbols. Any message symbol Wm,k(ℓ) that is secret-shared among servers Rm, is
protected by the X noise symbols Zm,1,(ℓ)(k),Zm,2,(ℓ)(k), · · · ,Zm,X,(ℓ)(k) that are i.i.d. uniform
and coded according to an MDS(X, ρmin) code, so that the shares accessible to any set of up to X
colluding servers are independent of Wm,k(ℓ). Thus the scheme is X-secure.
The query sent to Server n is
Q[µ,κ]n = {Q
[µ,κ]
m,n,(ℓ),∀m ∈ Mn, ℓ ∈ [L]} (49)
where,
Q
[µ,κ]
m,n,(ℓ)
=
vm,n
ℓ+ βn

F[µ,κ]m + ∑
t∈[T ]
(ℓ+ βn)
tZ′m,t,(ℓ)

 (50)
F
[µ,κ]
m are demand vectors defined as
F[µ,κ]m =
{
eκ, if m = µ,
0, otherwise.
(51)
where eκ is the κ
th column of the Km ×Km identity matrix. The values of F
[µ,κ]
m are kept private
from any set of up to T colluding servers, by the Km × 1 column vectors Z
′
m,t,(ℓ) comprised of i.i.d
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uniform noise symbols, for all m ∈ [M ], t ∈ [T ], ℓ ∈ [L]. Note that the noise vectors that protect
F
[µ,κ]
m are coded according to an MDS(T, ρmin) code spread across the queries sent to servers in
Rm, i.e., all queries that contain F
[µ,κ]
m , so that the queries accessible to any set of up to T servers
reveal no information about the demand vectors. Thus, the scheme is T -private.
The constant values vm,n in (50) are defined as
vm,n ,

 ∏
n′∈Rm\{n}
(βn − βn′)

−1 (52)
As shown in Lemma 2 in Appendix A using the properties of dual GRS codes, this choice of vm,n
satisfies the crucial property that ∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
j
n = 0 (53)
for all m ∈ [M ] and for all j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , ρmin − 2}.
The answer returned by Server n is
A[µ,κ]n =
∑
ℓ∈[L]
∑
m∈Mn
W
(n)
m,(ℓ)Q
[µ,κ]
m,n,(ℓ) (54)
Upon receiving all N answers, the user evaluates the L values Y1, Y2, · · · , YL, as follows.

Y1
Y2
...
YL

 =


1 1 · · · 1
β1 β2 · · · βN
...
... · · ·
...
βL−11 β
L−1
2 · · · β
L−1
N




A
[µ,κ]
1
A
[µ,κ]
2
...
A
[µ,κ]
N

 (55)
so that for all i ∈ [L],
Yi =
∑
n∈[N ]
βi−1n A
[µ,κ]
n (56)
=
∑
n∈[N ]
βi−1n
∑
l∈[L]
∑
m∈Mn
W
(n)
m,(ℓ)Q
[µ,κ]
m,n,(ℓ) (57)
=
∑
ℓ∈[L]
∑
m∈[M ]
∑
n∈Rm
βi−1n W
(n)
m,(ℓ)Q
[µ,κ]
m,n,(ℓ) (58)
=
∑
ℓ∈[L]
∑
m∈[M ]
∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
i−1
n
ℓ+ βn

Wm,(ℓ) + ∑
x∈[X]
(ℓ+ βn)
xZm,x,(ℓ)



F[µ,κ]m + ∑
t∈[T ]
(ℓ+ βn)
tZ′m,t,(ℓ)


(59)
=
∑
ℓ∈[L]
∑
m∈[M ]
∑
n∈Rm

vm,nβi−1n
ℓ+ βn
Wm,(ℓ)F
[µ,κ]
m +
∑
t∈[T ]
vm,nβ
i−1
n (ℓ+ βn)
t−1Wm,(ℓ)Z
′
m,t,(ℓ)
+
∑
x∈[X]
vm,nβ
i−1
n (ℓ+ βn)
x−1Zm,x,(ℓ)F
[µ,κ]
m
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+
∑
x∈[X]
∑
t∈[T ]
vm,nβ
i−1
n (ℓ+ βn)
x+t−1Zm,x,(ℓ)Z
′
m,t,(ℓ)

 (60)
=
∑
ℓ∈[L]
∑
m∈[M ]
∑
n∈Rm
(
vm,nβ
i−1
n
ℓ+ βn
Wm,(ℓ)F
[µ,κ]
m
)
+
∑
ℓ∈[L]
∑
m∈[M ]

∑
t∈[T ]
Wm,(ℓ)Z
′
m,t,(ℓ)
( ∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
i−1
n (ℓ+ βn)
t−1
)
+
∑
ℓ∈[L]
∑
m∈[M ]

∑
x∈[X]
Zm,x,(ℓ)F
[µ,κ]
m
( ∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
i−1
n (ℓ+ βn)
x−1
)
+
∑
ℓ∈[L]
∑
m∈[M ]

∑
x∈[X]
∑
t∈[T ]
Zm,x,(ℓ)Z
′
m,t,(ℓ)
( ∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
i−1
n (ℓ+ βn)
x+t−1
)
(61)
The terms
(∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
i−1
n (ℓ+ βn)
t−1
)
,
(∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
i−1
n (ℓ+ βn)
x−1
)
and(∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
i−1
n (ℓ+ βn)
x+t−1
)
are equal to zero because of (53). This is because all of these
can be expanded into weighted sums of terms of the form
∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
j
n for j taking values in
{0, 1, · · · , ρmin − 2}. Let us show this explicitly for
∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
i−1
n (ℓ+ βn)
t−1 as follows,
∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
i−1
n (ℓ+ βn)
t−1 =
∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
i−1
n

 ∑
τ∈{0,1,··· ,t−1}
(
t− 1
τ
)
βτnℓ
t−1−τ

 (62)
=
∑
τ∈{0,1,··· ,t−1}
(
t− 1
τ
)
ℓt−1−τ
( ∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
i+τ−1
n
)
(63)
= 0 (64)
because 0 ≤ i+ τ − 1 ≤ L+ (T − 1)− 1 = ρmin−X − 2 ≤ ρmin − 2. It can be similarly shown that(∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
i−1
n (ℓ+ βn)
x−1
)
= 0 and
(∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
i−1
n (ℓ+ βn)
x+t−1
)
= 0. Thus, we have,
Yi =
∑
ℓ∈[L]
∑
m∈[M ]
∑
n∈Rm
(
vm,nβ
i−1
n
ℓ+ βn
Wm,(ℓ)F
[µ,κ]
m
)
(65)
=
∑
ℓ∈[L]
∑
m∈[M ]
Wm,(ℓ)F
[µ,κ]
m
( ∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
i−1
n
ℓ+ βn
)
(66)
=
∑
ℓ∈[L]
Wµ,(ℓ)eκ

∑
n∈Rµ
vµ,nβ
i−1
n
ℓ+ βn

 (67)
=
∑
ℓ∈[L]
∑
n∈Rµ
Wµ,κ(ℓ)
vµ,nβ
i−1
n
ℓ+ βn
(68)
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Note that we used (51) to obtain (67). In matrix notation, we have,

Y1
Y2
...
YL

 =


1 · · · 1
βRµ(1) · · · βRµ(ρm)
...
...
...
βL−1Rµ(1) · · · β
L−1
Rµ(ρm)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
A


vµ,Rµ(1)
1+βRµ(1)
. . .
vµ,Rµ(1)
L+βRµ(1)
...
...
...
vµ,Rµ(ρm)
1+βRµ(ρm)
. . .
vµ,Rµ(ρm)
L+βRµ(ρm)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
B


Wµ,κ(1)
Wµ,κ(2)
...
Wµ,κ(L)

 . (69)
If the L × L matrix AB is invertible, the desired message is retrievable. This can be proved as
follows. Guaranteed by Lemma 2 and the definitions of vm,n and βn, ∀m ∈ [M ], n ∈ [N ], the rows
of the L× ρm matrix A generate the null space of the following ρm × (ρm − L) matrix.
C =


vµ,Rµ(1) vµ,Rµ(1)βRµ(1) . . . vµ,Rµ(1)β
ρm−L−1
Rµ(1)
...
...
...
...
vµ,Rµ(ρm) vµ,Rµ(ρm)βRµ(ρm) . . . vµ,Rµ(ρm)βρm−L−1
Rµ(ρm)

 (70)
Next we note that by Lemma 5 in [1], the ρm×ρm matrix [B|C] is invertible. Therefore the matrix
AB must be invertible, and the desired message is retrievable. Thus the scheme is correct. This
completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
4.1 A Private Computation Scheme for X = 0, ρmin = T + 1.
From the description of the scheme, it is evident that the demand vectors are protected by the
uniform noise, regardless of how they are chosen. Modifying the choice of demand vectors would
allow the user to privately retrieve various forms of desired information, generalizing the scheme
to broader applications. Here we present a simple example that will also be useful for the proof of
Theorem 3.
Suppose there are no security constraints (X = 0) and every message is replicated T + 1 times
(ρmin = T + 1), so that that our scheme operates over blocks comprised of L = ρmin −X − T = 1
symbol per message. Recall that our scheme allows the user to retrieve an arbitrary message Wµ,κ
at the rate R = (ρmin −X − T )/N = 1/N in this setting. Now, suppose instead of an arbitrary
message, the user wants to retrieve an arbitrary linear combination of all messages,
λ(W) ,
∑
m∈[M ]
∑
k∈Km
λm,kWm,k(1) =
∑
m∈[M ]
Wm,(1)λm, ∀ℓ ∈ [L] (71)
where
λm = [λm,1, λm,2, · · · , λm,Km ]
T ∈ FKm×1q , ∀m ∈ [M ], (72)
are the combining coefficients to be kept private from any set of up to T colluding servers. This
is a form of the private linear computation problem studied in [21] applied here to graph based
replicated storage. To apply our scheme to this setting, replace the demand vectors F
[µ,κ]
m with F
[λ]
m
defined as follows.
F[λ]m =
( ∑
n∈Rm
vm,n
1 + βn
)−1
λm (73)
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so that continuing from (66) we have
Yi =
∑
ℓ∈[L]
∑
m∈[M ]
Wm,(ℓ)F
[λ]
m
( ∑
n∈Rm
vm,nβ
i−1
n
ℓ+ βn
)
, i ∈ [L] = {1} (74)
(75)
⇒ Y1 =
∑
m∈[M ]
Wm,(1)λm
( ∑
n∈Rm
vm,n
1 + βn
)−1( ∑
n∈Rm
vm,n
1 + βn
)
(76)
=
∑
m∈[M ]
Wm,(1)λm = λ(W) (77)
Thus, a private computation scheme is readily obtained for the case where all messages are replicated
at least T + 1 times. The rate of this scheme is (ρmin − T )/N = 1/N . Just as in [21], there is no
rate loss relative to the case where the user wants to retrieve only one message Wµ,κ.
5 Proof of Theorem 2
Let T be a subset of Rm, such that |T | = max(|Rm|, T ). Let X be a subset of Rm \ T , such that
|X | = max(|Rm| − |T |,X). Note that it follows from the definition that T ∩ X = ∅. From the
decodability of message Wm,k we have,
L = I
(
Wm,k ; A
[m,k]
[N ] | Q
[m,k]
[N ]
)
(78)
≤ I
(
Wm,k ; A
[m,k]
Rm\X
, S[N ]\Rm , SX | Q
[m,k]
[N ]
)
(79)
= I
(
Wm,k ; S[N ]\Rm, SX | Q
[m,k]
[N ]
)
+ I
(
Wm,k ; A
[m,k]
Rm\X
| S[N ]\Rm, SX , Q
[m,k]
[N ]
)
(80)
= I
(
Wm,k ; A
[m,k]
Rm\X
| SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
[N ]
)
(81)
= I
(
Wm,k ; A
[m,k]
T , A
[m,k]
(Rm\X )\T
| SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
[N ]
)
(82)
= I
(
Wm,k;A
[m,k]
T | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
[N ]
)
+ I
(
Wm,k;A
[m,k]
(Rm\X )\T
| A
[m,k]
T , SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
[N ]
)
(83)
≤ I(Wm,k;A
[m,k]
T | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
[N ] ) +
∑
n∈(Rm\X )\T
H(A[m,k]n ) (84)
≤ I(Wm,k;A
[m,k]
T | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
T ) +
∑
n∈(Rm\X )\T
H(A[m,k]n ) (85)
≤ I(Wm,k;A
[m,k′]
T | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k′]
T ) +
∑
n∈(Rm\X )\T
H(A[m,k
′]
n ) (86)
In (79) we used the fact that A
[m,k]
[N ]\(Rm\X )
is a function of
(
S[N ]\Rm , SX , Q
[m,k]
[N ]
)
, and I(A; f(B,C) |
C) ≤ I(A; f(B,C), B | C) = I(A;B | C) + I(A; f(B,C) | B,C) = I(A;B | C) where f(B,C) is
some function of B,C. The chain rule of mutual information is used for (80). For (81) we used the
fact that (S[N ]\Rm , SX ) is independent of
(
Wm,k, Q
[m,k]
[N ]
)
according to Lemma 3. The next step,
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(82) simply re-writes the same expression in different notation, while (83) follows from chain rule of
mutual information. For (84) we used the fact that I(A;B | C) = H(B | C)−H(B | A,C) ≤ H(B)
because entropy is non-negative and conditioning reduces entropy. (85) follows from Lemma 4.
(86) follows because I(Q
[m,κ]
T , A
[m,κ]
T , S[N ];κ) = 0 according to Lemma 5. Equivalently,(
Q
[m,k]
T , A
[m,k]
T , S[N ]
)
∼
(
Q
[m,k′]
T , A
[m,k′]
T , S[N ]
)
(87)
for all m ∈ [M ] and k, k′ ∈ [Km], which in turn implies (86).
Summing (86) over all k ∈ [Km] we have
KmL ≤

 ∑
k∈[Km]
I(Wm,k;A
[m,k′]
T | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k′]
T )

+Km ∑
n∈(Rm\X )\T
H(A[m,k
′]
n ) (88)
≤ I(Wm,1, · · · ,Wm,Km ;A
[m,k′]
T | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k′]
T ) +Km
∑
n∈(Rm\X )\T
H(A[m,k
′]
n ) (89)
≤ H(A
[m,k′]
T ) +Km
∑
n∈(Rm\X )\T
H(A[m,k
′]
n ) (90)
(89) follows from the chain rule of mutual information and repeated use of the property that
I(A;C | D) + I(B;C | D) ≤ I(A;C | D) + I(B;C | A,D) = I(A,B;C | D) when A,B are
independent conditioned on D, i.e., I(A;B | D) = 0. This conditional independence property for
(89) is proved in Lemma 6. (90) follows from the facts that entropy is non-negative and conditioning
reduces entropy, i.e., I(A;B | C) = H(A | C)−H(A | B,C) ≤ H(A | C) ≤ H(A).
From (90) we note that if |Rm| ≤ X+T then Rm\X\T = ∅, which means that as Km →∞, we
must have H(A
[m,k′]
T ) → ∞, and since the download approaches infinity, the asymptotic capacity
is zero. This is the degenerate case in Theorem 2.
Having dealt with the degenerate setting, henceforth, let us assume that |Rm| > X + T for
all m ∈ [M ]. Since the capacity for this case is not zero (follows from achievability), there is
no loss of generality in assuming that the asymptotic value of download cost is bounded, i.e.,
H(A
[m,k′]
n )/Km = o(1) as a function of Km for all n ∈ [N ]. Recall that f(x) = o(1) is equivalent to
the condition that limx→∞ f(x) = 0. In this case we have
∑
n∈(Rm\X )\T
H(A
[m,k′]
n )
L
+ o(1) ≥ 1 (91)
⇒
∑
n∈(Rm\X )\T
Dn + o(1) ≥ 1. (92)
where Dn =
H(A
[m,k′]
n )
L
is defined as the value of download from server n, normalized by L. As
K → ∞ all o(1) terms approach 0 and we obtain the set of conditions that define D in (27). The
capacity bound in Theorem 2 for the non-degenerate setting follows from the definition of capacity
as the supremum of L/D = (D1 + · · ·+DN )
−1. 
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6 Proof of Theorem 3
6.1 Proof of Converse for Theorem 3
It already follows from Theorem 2 that if ρmin ≤ T then the capacity is zero. So let us assume
that ρmin > T . Theorem 3 also limits ρm ≤ T + 2 for all m ∈ [M ], therefore we must have
ρm ∈ {T + 1, T + 2} for all m ∈ [M ], i.e., every message is either (T + 1)-replicated or (T + 2)-
replicated. Recall that NT+2 is the set of servers that do not store any messages that are (T + 1)-
replicated. The remaining servers are in NT+1.
According to the general converse bound in Theorem 2, the asymptotic capacity C∞ is bounded
above by the maximum value of (D1 + · · ·+DN )
−1 subject to the constraints,
Du +Dv ≥ 1, ∀uv ∈ E[NT+2] (93)
Dt ≥ 1, ∀t ∈ [NT+1] (94)
We use the notation G[NT+2] to represent the induced subgraph of G[V,E] whose vertex set is
NT+2 and whose edge set, denoted E[NT+2] consists of all edges uv ∈ E such that u, v ∈ NT+2.
Recall that a 2-matching in G[NT+2] is a vector x that assigns to each edge uv ∈ E[NT+2], a value
from {0, 1, 2} such that the sum of values assigned to all edges in E[NT+2] that are incident with
any vertex n ∈ NT+2 is not more than 2. Let x be the vector that produces the maximum size
2-matching in G[NT+2], i.e., the size of x is∑
uv∈E[NT+2]
x(uv) = ν2(G[NT+2]). (95)
Multiplying both sides of (93) by x(uv), summing up over all uv ∈ E[NT+2], and adding 2× (94),
we have ∑
uv∈E[NT+2]
(Du +Dv)x(uv) + 2
∑
t∈[NT+1]
(Dt) ≥
∑
uv∈E[NT+2]
x(uv) + 2|NT+1| (96)
⇒
∑
u∈NT+2
x(δ(u) ∩ E[NT+2])(Du) + 2
∑
t∈[NT+1]
(Dt) ≥ ν2(G[NT+2]) + 2|NT+1| (97)
⇒ 2
∑
u∈NT+2
(Du) + 2
∑
t∈[NT+1]
(Dt) ≥ ν2(G[NT+2]) + 2|NT+1| (98)
⇒ 2
∑
u∈[N ]
(Du) ≥ ν2(G[NT+2]) + 2|NT+1| (99)
⇒ (D1 +D2 + · · ·+Dn) ≥
ν2(G[NT+2]) + 2|NT+1|
2
(100)
In (98) we used the fact that the sum of values assigned by x to all edges in E[NT+2] that are
incident with the vertex u is not more than 2. Combining (100) with the result of Theorem 2, we
obtain the desired converse bound
C∞ ≤
2
ν2(G[NT+2]) + 2|NT+1|
. (101)
Thus, the proof of converse for Theorem 3 is complete. 
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6.2 Proof of Achievability for Theorem 3
Let us define WT+1 as the set of messages that are replicated T + 1 times. Let U ⊂ NT+2 be a
stable set. We will show that it is possible to retrieve L = 2 desired symbols with a total normalized
download,
D1 + · · ·+DN =
|[1 : N ]\U |+ |N (U) ∪ NT+1|
2
(102)
The achievable scheme does not use the servers in U . Let WU denote the set of messages that are
stored at any of the servers in U . Note that none of these messages is in WT+1 because U ⊂ NT+2.
Also note that no message is replicated more than once in U because U is a stable set. After the
servers in U are eliminated, the messages W∗ = WU ∪ WT+1 are now replicated exactly (T + 1)
times in the remaining servers. All other messages are replicated (T + 2) times. As a thought
experiment, suppose we add a genie server that storesW∗. Now we have a storage system where all
messages are replicated (T +2) times, so that the scheme presented in the proof of Theorem 1 can
be used to retrieve L = 2 desired symbols while downloading |[N ]\U | + 1 symbols, which includes
one genie symbol, say λ(W∗). In order to obtain λ(W∗) without a genie, we will use the servers
in the set N (U) ∪ NT+1. Note that N (U) and NT+1 may have some servers in common. More
importantly, note that W∗ is replicated (T + 1) times within this set. Therefore, we can privately
retrieve λ(W∗) by downloading one symbol from each of these servers, with the scheme described
in Section 4.1. Thus, we have a private and correct scheme that retrieves L = 2 desired symbols
with a total download of |[N ]\U | + |N (U) ∪ NT+1|. Next, we note the following identity,
|[N ]\U |︸ ︷︷ ︸
t1
+ |N (U) ∪ NT+1|︸ ︷︷ ︸
t2
= |NT+2\U |︸ ︷︷ ︸
t3
+ |N (U) ∩ NT+2|︸ ︷︷ ︸
t4
+2|NT+1|︸ ︷︷ ︸
t5
(103)
U
N (U)
NT+2 NT+1
Figure 2: General setting of U ⊂ NT+2 which may have neighbors N (U) both in NT+1 and NT+2.
Note that N (U) does not include U .
Let us verify that the identity holds as follows. First consider the servers in NT+1. On the LHS
all these servers are included in t1 as well as t2, i.e., they are counted twice. On the RHS these
servers are included only in t5 which is scaled by a factor of 2, so both sides match. Now consider
servers that are in NT+2 and are neighbors of servers in U . On the LHS these servers are included
in t1 as well as t2, i.e., they are counted twice. On the RHS, these servers are included in t3 as
well as t4, so again they are counted twice and the two sides match. Finally, consider the servers
that are in NT+2 but are neither in U nor among the neighbors of the servers in U . On the LHS
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all these servers are included in t1, while on the RHS they are included in t3. Thus on both sides
these servers are included once, and the two sides match. Finally, note that the servers in U are
not included in any term on either the LHS or the RHS. Thus, we have verified that 103 holds.
Now, let us recall that according to (29),
ν2(G[NT+2]) = min{|NT+2\U |+ |N (U) ∩ NT+2|
∣∣∣ such that U ⊂ NT+2, U is a stable set}. (104)
Therefore, minimizing over U ∈ NT+2, the scheme achieves the normalized download,
D1 + · · ·+DN =
ν2(G[NT+2])
2
+ |NT+1|, (105)
and therefore we have a lower bound on capacity,
C∞ ≥
2
ν2(G[NT+2]) + 2|NT+1|
. (106)
Because the achievable scheme works for any number of messages, it is notable that this lower bound
holds not only for asymptotic capacity, but also for capacity with arbitrary number of messages
Km. This completes the proof of achievability for Theorem 3. 
7 Conclusion
The asymptotic capacity of GXSTPIR studied in this work reveals important insights into the
structure of optimal schemes for graph-based replicated storage. In particular the special structure
inspired by dual GRS codes emerges as a powerful idea for GXSTPIR. Generalizations of the
private computation scheme presented in Section 4.1 represent an interesting problem for future
work, especially because such private computation schemes are needed for GXSTPIR, as evident
from the achievability proof of Theorem 3. Asymptotic capacity for GPIR with arbitrary graph
based storage when each message is replicated 4 times is the next step for the direction initiated by
Theorem 3. The relationship between GXSTPIR and index coding, through the connecting thread
of min-rank problems that arise in both contexts is another promising research avenue. Finally,
the tightness of the converse bound in Theorem 2 remains an interesting question. Given that the
bound is tight in all cases for which the asymptotic capacity is settled so far, it is tempting to
conjecture that the converse bound is tight in general. Settling this conjecture is perhaps the most
important immediate objective for future work on the asymptotic capacity of GXSTPIR.
A Lemmas
Lemma 1. The optimal value of total normalized download, minD(D1+D2+· · ·+DN ), in Theorem
2 is equal to the fractional matching number of G[V, E ].
Proof. Let us consider the non-degenerate scenario, ρmin > X + T , because otherwise the asymp-
totic capacity is zero. According to Theorem 2, the optimal value of total normalized download
minD(D1 +D2 + · · ·+DN ) is expressed as the result of the following linear program.
D∗ =min
∑
n∈[N ]
Dn (107)
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such that, (108)∑
n: n∈e
Dn ≥ 1, ∀e ∈ E (109)
Dn ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ [N ] (110)
Since the linear program is bounded and feasible, by the strong duality of linear programming, we
have as its dual the following linear program.
D∗ = max
∑
e∈E
xe (111)
such that, (112)∑
e: e∋n
xe ≤ 1, ∀n ∈ [N ] (113)
xe ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ E (114)
Thus, the optimal converse boundD∗ is precisely the maximum weight of a fractional 1-matching in
G. Therefore, the converse bound in Theorem 2 coincides with the achievability bound in Theorem
1 if and only if D∗ = N
ρmin−X−T
. This completes the proof of Lemma 1. 
Lemma 2. For distinct non-zero values β1, · · · , βn and for v1, · · · , vn defined as
vi ,

 ∏
j∈[n]\{i}
(βi − βj)

−1 , i ∈ [n] (115)
the following identity is satisfied,∑
i∈[n]
viβ
j
i = 0, ∀j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n− 2}. (116)
Proof. The proof of Lemma 2 follows directly from the properties of dual GRS codes for which we
refer the reader to [37]. For our purpose let us recall that given two n-dimensional vectors
u = [u1, u2, · · · , un] (117)
β = [β1, β2, · · · , βn] (118)
where u1, u2, · · · , un are non-zero, while β1, β2, · · · , βn are non-zero and distinct, the canonical
generator matrix for the Generalized Reed-Solomon code GRSk,n(u,β) is given by

u1 u2 · · · un
u1β1 u2β2 · · · unβn
...
... · · ·
...
u1β
k−1
1 u2β
k−1
2 · · · unβ
k−1
n

 (119)
The dual code of a GRS code is also a GRS code. Specifically, the dual for GRSk,n(u,β) is
GRSn−k,n(v,β) where v = [v1, v2, · · · , vn] and vi =
(
ui
∏
j∈[n]\{i}(βi − βj)
)−1
. For the purpose of
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Lemma 2 let us set u1 = u2 = · · · = un = 1. Since the dual of a code C is a code C
⊥ that spans
the null space of C, we have

v1 v2 · · · vn
v1β1 v2β2 · · · vnβn
...
... · · ·
...
v1β
k−1
1 v2β
k−1
2 · · · vnβ
k−1
n




1 β1 · · · β
n−k−1
1
1 β2 · · · β
n−k−1
2
...
... · · ·
...
1 βn · · · β
n−k−1
n

 = 0 (120)
which implies that ∑
i∈[n]
viβ
j
i = 0 (121)
for j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n − 2}. This completes the proof of Lemma 2. 
Lemma 3. For all m ∈ [M ], k ∈ [Km], X ⊂ Rm, |X | ≤ X,
I
(
S[N ]\Rm , SX ;Wm,k, Q
[m,k]
[N ]
)
= 0. (122)
Proof.
I(S[N ]\Rm , SX ;Wm,k, Q
[m,k]
[N ] ) (123)
= I(Wm,k;S[N ]\Rm , SX ) + I(Q
[m,k]
[N ] ;S[N ]\Rm, SX |Wm,k) (124)
≤ I(Wm,k;S[N ]\Rm , SX ) + I(Q
[m,k]
[N ] ;S[N ]\Rm, SX ,Wm,k) (125)
= I(Wm,k;S[N ]\Rm , SX ) (126)
≤ I(Wm,k;W
′
,W
(X )
m,k) (127)
= I(Wm,k;W
(X )
m,k) + I(Wm,k;W
′
|W
(X )
m,k) (128)
= I(Wm,k;W
′
|W
(X )
m,k) (129)
≤ I(Wm,k,W
(X )
m,k;W
′
) (130)
≤ I(Wm,k;W
′
) (131)
= 0. (132)
where W
′
= (Wm′,k′ ,∀m
′ ∈ [M ], k′ ∈ [Km], (m
′, k′) 6= (m,k)), and W
(X )
m,k = (W
(n)
m,k, n ∈ X ). Steps
of the proof are justified as follows. (124) and (125) follow from the chain rule and the non-
negativity of mutual information. (126) follows from (18), while (127), follows from the definition
of replicated storage in (10). (128) is the chain rule of mutual information, while (129) follows
from the security constraint in (16). (130) follows from chain rule and the non-negativity of mutual
information. In (131) we used the fact that (Wm,k,W
(X )
m,k) is function of Wm,k, and the last step
follows from (8). This completes the proof of Lemma 3. 
Lemma 4. For all m ∈ [M ], k ∈ [Km], X ,T ⊂ Rm,
I(Wm,k;A
[m,k]
T | SX , S[N ]\Rm, Q
[m,k]
[N ] ) ≤ I(Wm,k;A
[m,k]
T | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
T ). (133)
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Proof.
I(Wm,k;A
[m,k]
T | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
[N ] )
= H(A
[m,k]
T | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
[N ]
)−H(A
[m,k]
T |Wm,k, SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
[N ]
) (134)
≤ H(A
[m,k]
T | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
T )−H(A
[m,k]
T |Wm,k, SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
[N ] ) (135)
= H(A
[m,k]
T | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
T )−H(A
[m,k]
T |Wm,k, SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
T )
+H(A
[m,k]
T |Wm,k, SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
T )−H(A
[m,k]
T |Wm,k, SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
[N ] ) (136)
= I(Wm,k;A
[m,k]
T | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
T ) + I(A
[m,k]
T ;Q
[m,k]
[N ] | Wm,k, SX , S[N ]\Rm, Q
[m,k]
T ) (137)
≤ I(Wm,k;A
[m,k]
T | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
T ) + I(A
[m,k]
T ,Wm,k, SX , S[N ]\Rm ;Q
[m,k]
[N ] | Q
[m,k]
T ) (138)
≤ I(Wm,k;A
[m,k]
T | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
T ) + I(A
[m,k]
T , S[N ];Q
[m,k]
[N ]
| Q
[m,k]
T ) (139)
= I(Wm,k;A
[m,k]
T | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
T ) + I(S[N ];Q
[m,k]
[N ] | Q
[m,k]
T ) + I(A
[m,k]
T ;Q
[m,k]
[N ] | S[N ], Q
[m,k]
T )
(140)
= I(Wm,k;A
[m,k]
T | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
T ) (141)
(134) follows from the definition of mutual information, (135) because dropping conditioning cannot
reduce entropy, (136) adds and subtracts the same term so nothing changes, (137) uses the definition
of mutual information, (138) uses the chain rule of mutual information and the fact that mutual
information is always non-negative, (139) uses the fact that
(
Wm,k, SX , S[N ]\Rm
)
is a function of
S[N ] according to (9) and (10), and (140) uses chain rule of mutual information. For (141) we use
the fact that S[N ] is independent of Q
[m,k]
[N ] according to (18), and A
[m,k]
T is fully determined by
S[N ], Q
[m,k]
T according to (20). This completes the proof of Lemma 4. 
Lemma 5. For any m ∈ [M ], T ⊂ Rm, |T | ≤ T ,
I(Q
[m,κ]
T , A
[m,κ]
T , S[N ];κ) = 0 (142)
Proof.
I(Q
[m,κ]
T , A
[m,κ]
T , S[N ];κ) = I(Q
[m,κ]
T ;κ) + I(S[N ];κ | Q
[m,κ]
T ) + I(A
[m,κ]
T ;κ | S[N ], Q
[m,κ]
T ) (143)
= I(Q
[m,κ]
T ;κ) + I(S[N ];κ | Q
[m,κ]
T ) (144)
≤ I(Q
[m,κ]
T ;κ) + I(S[N ];κ,Q
[m,κ]
T ) (145)
= 0 (146)
(143) is the chain rule of mutual information, (144) follows because A
[µ,κ]
T is fully determined by
S[N ], Q
[µ,κ]
T according to (20). The next step, (145) follows because of the chain rule of mutual
information and the non-negativity of mutual information, and (146) follows from (18),(19). This
completes the proof of Lemma 5. 
Lemma 6. For any m ∈ [M ], k ∈ [Km] and subsets X ,T ⊂ Rm such that |X | ≤ X,
I
(
Wm,K ; Wm,K′ | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k]
T
)
= 0 (147)
where K ⊂ [Km], K
′ = [Km] \ K, Wm,K = (Wm,k, k ∈ K) and Wm,K′ = (Wm,k, k ∈ K
′).
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Proof. Let us define WM′ = (Wm′,k,∀m
′ ∈ [M ], k ∈ [Km′ ],m
′ 6= m). Wm,K = (Wm,k, k ∈ K).
Wm,K′ = (Wm,k, k ∈ K
′). W
(X )
m,K = (W
(n)
m,k, n ∈ X , k ∈ K). W
(X )
m,K′ = (W
(n)
m,k, n ∈ X , k ∈ K
′).
I(Wm,K;Wm,K′ | SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k′]
T ) (148)
≤ I(Wm,K;Wm,K′ , SX , S[N ]\Rm , Q
[m,k′]
T ) (149)
= I(Wm,K;Wm,K′ , SX , S[N ]\Rm) + I(Wm,K;Q
[m,k′]
T | Wm,K′ , SX , S[N ]\Rm) (150)
≤ I(Wm,K;Wm,K′ , SX , S[N ]\Rm) + I(Q
[m,k′]
T ;Wm,K,Wm,K′ , SX , S[N ]\Rm) (151)
= I(Wm,K;Wm,K′ , SX , S[N ]\Rm) (152)
≤ I(Wm,K;Wm,K′ ,WM′ ,W
(X )
m,K,W
(X )
m,K′) (153)
≤ I(Wm,K;Wm,K′ ,WM′ ,W
(X )
m,K) (154)
= I(Wm,K;W
(X )
m,K) + I(Wm,K;Wm,K′ ,WM′ | W
(X )
m,K) (155)
= I(Wm,K;Wm,K′ ,WM′ | W
(X )
m,K) (156)
≤ I(Wm,K,W
(X )
m,K;Wm,K′ ,WM′) (157)
≤ I(Wm,K;Wm,K′ ,WM′) (158)
= 0. (159)
(149), (150), (151) follows from the chain rule and the non-negativity of mutual information. (152)
holds because of (18), while in (153), we used the definition of the storage as in (10). (154) follows
because
(
Wm,K′ ,W
(X )
m,K′
)
is function ofWm,K′ . (155) is again the chain rule of mutual information,
and (156) follows from the X-security constraint as in (16). (157) follows from the chain rule and
the non-negativity of mutual information, while in (158), we used the fact that
(
Wm,K,W
(X )
m,K
)
is
function of Wm,K. The last step holds because of (8). This completes the proof of Lemma 6. 
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